The memo's contents make clear that Bush and Blair were both preparing for the illegal invasion of Iraq, whether or not Saddam was found to have WMDs and regardless of whether the UN was prepared to accept a second resolution.
"Our diplomatic strategy had to be arranged around the military planning," David Manning, Mr. Blair's chief foreign policy adviser at the time, wrote in the memo that summarized the discussion between Mr. Bush, Mr. Blair and six of their top aides.
"The start date for the military campaign was now penciled in for 10 March," Mr. Manning wrote, paraphrasing the president. "This was when the bombing would begin."
The timetable had already been chosen so that everything that happened after that point diplomatically just smoke and mirrors - as Powell's subsequent presentation to the UN turned out to be.
This, perhaps, is one of the most damning realizations to come out of that memo as it relates to what is currently going on in Iraq:
The memo indicates the two leaders envisioned a quick victory and a transition to a new Iraqi government that would be complicated, but manageable. Mr. Bush predicted that it was "unlikely there would be internecine warfare between the different religious and ethnic groups." Mr. Blair agreed with that assessment.
One surely is left wondering who, in their right mind, would not have been able to conceive of such a reality knowing the history of the country itself. Yet, there were the world's top two leaders - absolutely clueless about reality and, apparently, surrounded by learned advisors who did not dispute their simple-minded assessments.
The proposal for a second UN resolution was basically for window dressing and possible damage control:
The memo said Mr. Blair told Mr. Bush, "If anything went wrong with the military campaign, or if Saddam increased the stakes by burning the oil wells, killing children or fomenting internal divisions within Iraq, a second resolution would give us international cover, especially with the Arabs."
Running Out of Time
Mr. Bush agreed that the two countries should attempt to get a second resolution, but he added that time was running out. "The U.S. would put its full weight behind efforts to get another resolution and would twist arms and even threaten," Mr. Bush was paraphrased in the memo as saying.
The document added, "But he had to say that if we ultimately failed, military action would follow anyway."
The fix was already in and Bush would use any means possible to get the UN Security Council to do his bidding. He failed.
Bush certainly looked at the planned invasion through rose-coloured glasses, so it's not surprising that his administration was so ill-prepared for the fallout. The memo notes that Condi Rice assured both leaders that the DoD was well-prepared for the aftermath but, obviously, it was severely short-sighted as "Bush said that a great deal of detailed planning had been done on supplying the Iraqi people with food and medicine" - tasks that have still not been sufficiently resolved.
This memo, along with the previous publication of the Downing Street Memos, clearly indicates that Bush and Blair were on a war footing that neither would have curtailed regardless of any facts presented to them or any international effort made to dissuade them from their goals.
What played out on the world stage was only an appearance of diplomacy while there was actually no willingness behind the scenes to abide by the UN Security Council's wishes. It was political theatre that has cost Iraq war victims and coalition troops thousands of lives. To what end?
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