Beyond what we already know, one conclusion is long overdue:
The Intelligence Community judges that the term “civil war” does not adequately capture the complexity of the conflict in Iraq, which includes extensive Shia-on-Shia violence, al-Qa’ida and Sunni insurgent attacks on Coalition forces, and widespread criminally motivated violence. Nonetheless, the term “civil war” accurately describes key elements of the Iraqi conflict, including the hardening of ethno-sectarian identities, a sea change in the character of the violence, ethno-sectarian mobilization, and population displacements.
This is what put the Bush administration between a rock and a hard place. They've repeatedly said they won't have US forces in the middle of an Iraqi civil war and have refused to identify the situation in Iraq as such as a result yet, there they are. The NIE concludes then that an immediate withdrawal would be a mistake and goes on to to (predictably) warn against Iranian and Syrian influence although it doesn't extend their influence to the fearmongering levels Bushco has employed.
Iraq’s neighbors influence, and are influenced by, events within Iraq, but the involvement of these outside actors is not likely to be a major driver of violence or the prospects for stability because of the self-sustaining character of Iraq’s internal sectarian dynamics. Nonetheless, Iranian lethal support for select groups of Iraqi Shia militants clearly intensifies the conflict in Iraq. Syria continues to provide safehaven for expatriate Iraqi Bathists and to take less than adequate measures to stop the flow of foreign jihadists into Iraq.
The NIE also warns about a possible sectarian partition in the country (which John Bolton and Joe Biden endorse):
Chaos Leading to Partition. With a rapid deterioration in the capacity of Iraq’s central government to function, security services and other aspects of sovereignty would collapse. Resulting widespread fighting could produce de facto partition, dividing Iraq into three mutually antagonistic parts. Collapse of this magnitude would generate fierce violence for at least several years, ranging well beyond the time frame of this Estimate, before settling into a partially stable end-state.
The NIE quite rightly describes the political divisions between the Shi'a, Sunnis and Kurds and offers some "if only" statements about what might occur if they could somehow work out their differences however it doesn't offer any real, immediate or effective options for settling those differences. The presence of coalition forces in Iraq seems to be a sidebar as it seems they're only there acting as a small bandaid on a gushing head wound.
Iraqi society’s growing polarization, the persistent weakness of the security forces and the state in general, and all sides’ ready recourse to violence are collectively driving an increase in communal and insurgent violence and political extremism. Unless efforts to reverse these conditions show measurable progress during the term of this Estimate, the coming 12 to 18 months, we assess that the overall security situation will continue to deteriorate at rates comparable to the latter part of 2006.
Bush, of course, seems to think that his troop escalation will bring about some of that 'measurable progress'. Wiser minds in congress disagree. And so they should. The result of any non-binding resolution however will be a timid slap on the president's wrist and that's not helpful to anyone.
Update: Welcome Slate readers!
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