Wednesday, May 03, 2006

Crawshaw to Ignatieff: Torture Doesn't Work

In last month's issue of Prospect Magazine, new Liberal party MP and former Harvard professor Michael Ignatieff, who is now running for leader of the Liberal party, pontificated:

If torture works...
The debate over torture is not as simple as it seems. Those of us who oppose torture under any circumstances should admit that ours is an unpopular policy that may make us more vulnerable to terrorism

Before I get into discussing that article and the rebuttal offered in this month's issue by Steve Crashaw, the director of Human Rights Watch, let me offer this advice to Liberals who support Ignatieff's run for leader of the party: the man has about 2 minutes worth of parliamentary experience. That ought to be enough to disqualify him from even being considered seriously as a viable option for party leader. Some Ignatieff supporters have offered his vast intellect as some sort of substitution for political experience. Let's be serious here. Ignatieff is not Trudeau and the fact that he's been hanging out at Harvard for years, contributing very little to this country by the way, should not fool anyone into thinking that he is qualified to run the Liberal party - or the country - if it comes to that. If Ignatieff wants the position, let him work for it and pay his dues for a good amount of time before anyone can ultimately say that he deserves to be crowned as the new king of the Liberals. His lack of experience cannot be seen as a plus for a party that will face yet another tough election the next time around.

Now, on to his views about torture.

Ignatieff began last month's article by stating, "It is difficult to think about torture honestly." Well, no Mr Ignatieff, it really isn't. Torture is inhumane and is against national and international laws. You're either for it or against it. Period. There really is no acceptable delineation between proper interrogation techniques and treatment that is obviously torturous - no matter what the Bush administration likes to think.

Ignatieff, in true intellectual fashion, argues semantics to make his point that the rules that govern interrogation practices muddy the waters of the definition of torture.

This is the crux of Ignatieff's personal dilemma:

Like Elshtain, I am willing to get my hands dirty, but unlike her, I have practical difficulty enumerating a list of coercive techniques that I would be willing to have a democratic society inflict in my name. I accept, for example, that a slap is not the same thing as a beating, but I still don't want interrogators to slap detainees because I cannot see how to prevent the occasional slap deteriorating into a regular practice of beating. The issue is not, as Elshtain implies, that I care overmuch about my own moral purity but rather that I cannot see any clear way to manage coercive interrogation institutionally so that it does not degenerate into torture.

The fact is that Ignatieff does not have to create "a list of coercive techniques". That's already been done for him. His problem is that he is unclear about what is acceptable to him, personally, when the state acts in his name. Ignatieff is clear that he believes in detainee rights and agrees that proper oversight is necessary in order to determine if their rights have been violated, however he does stand up for the so-called "conscientious offender" who would render torture under the 'ticking time-bomb theory' that would allow for torture under circumstances where it might produce results. That theory has been debunked by many legal and intelligence experts, so while Ignatieff may be comfortable defending it, he certainly is not in the majority.

He wrongly concludes, "The argument that torture and coercion do not work is contradicted by the dire frequency with which both practices occur." Anyone who has studied logic 101 knows that is a fallacious argument. For a Harvard professor to use such faulty logic in order to justify torture practices shows that his views are born of personal bias, not professionally sound reasoning.

Ignatieff shows this bias by stating:

Many of the arguments that human rights activists make in justification amount to the claim that torture shames their moral identity as human beings and as citizens, and that they do not wish such acts to be committed in their names. Other citizens in a democracy may not value their own moral scruple over the collective interest in having accurate security information, even if collected by dubious means. It may be obvious to human rights activists how to adjudicate these claims, but it is not obvious to me.

Now, if Mr Ignatieff is constitutionally incapable of arriving at a position that would ban torture in all cases, is he really someone the Liberal party of Canada should be embracing as its possible future leader? A man whose ambiguity on the issue of torture has been so obviously presented for the world to see? Can we trust Ignatieff as a future leader not to follow down the path of the neocons who invent legal justifications for torture? I think not.

Those of us who oppose torture should also be honest enough to admit that we may have to pay a price for our own convictions.

Ignatieff failed to prove any such price in his essay besides his own ambivalence which leaves him wondering if torture is, indeed, valuable or permissible.

I stand against all torture and there is no price to pay for that because I do so with a clear conscience and a clear mind that has examined the facts surrounding the use of torture.

Moving on to Cranshaw's rebuttal:

In last month's Prospect, Michael Ignatieff wondered if torture, under some circumstances, may make us safer. The answer is a firm no
[...]
Clearly, torture may sometimes persuade people to reveal information they would not otherwise have divulged. But that does not mean that permitting torture might keep us safe.

Ignatieff argues that an absolute ban on torture might prevent our intelligence services from gaining 'timely access to information that may save lives.' The 'ticking bomb' scenario, as it is usually known, can seem persuasive. If someone knows of a vast bomb primed to explode in the heart of central London, how could one not torture him, to save thousands of lives? Exposed to reality, however, the hypothetical is no longer so neat. It has damaging consequences for individuals and societies alike.

Crashaw cites the case of 'Peruvian student Magdalena Monteza, abducted as an alleged subversive' and Canada's Bill Sampson - both innocent yet both were forced, after being tortured, to sign confessions of their so-called crimes. There can be no question that such interrogation techniques do nothing to make us safer. In fact, they deliberately distort reality, which is favourable to those doing the torturing while the broader public has no idea what to believe. Case in point: Canada's Maher Arar.

Cranshaw continues:

Moral and practical arguments are inextricably intertwined. If some torture is justifiable in pursuit of the greater good, why not all torture? If the suspected terrorist is too hard a nut to crack, why not torture the man's wife or daughter? Is that not an acceptable price to pay to save lives?

The simple answer is no. Torture degrades the torturer and those who condone it; acceptance of torture undermines the very foundations, and thus the security, of our society.

That is his bottom line and it is mine as well. Cranshaw describes the situation in Iraq, particularly that at Abu Ghraib where detainees were tortured and rightly concludes: "In reality, the trampling of the rules has merely encouraged those who believe that mass murder of civilians can be justified, and may have helped give the terrorists fresh recruits."

Ignatieff is right to reject torture: "We cannot torture, because of who we are." None the less, if we allow ourselves to be seduced by arguments that torture helps keep us safe, the prospects for the 21st century look bleak.

No doubt.

Further, what disturbs me is the irrational disconnect I have witnessed by some on the left who scream to high heaven when opposing the Bush administration's torture policies while in the same breath admitting to their own torture fantasies. I came across one such entry the other day where a staunch left-winger who is opposed to the Iraq war and state-sponsored torture admitted that he would like to track down his wife's childhood abuser and torture him. That's extremely disturbing because it shows that, while there public a public outcry against the inhumanity of torture, some still carry the belief that it is actually justified. They may not want their country's government to do so in their name, but they are still expressing the belief that torture is a solution.

I would posit to Mr Ignatieff that one must certainly be honest with oneself about their views on torture - not to come to the false conclusion that it somehow makes anyone 'safer', but to confront our inner demons about what we truly believe about the issue. Without that type of rigorous honesty, the mixed messages in society will continue as will the lax sentences for torturers and the lack of accountability for government leaders who set such policies. If and only if one can resolve the internal conflicts over this issue, only then can true justice be demanded by a society that firmly stands behind its position that torture is not an option in all circumstances.

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