Perhaps because he is frustrated over his limited ability to command Iraqi forces against terrorists and insurgents, Maliki has been trying to show strength by standing up to the coalition. Hence the public spats with us over benchmarks and the Sadr City roadblocks.
Despite Maliki’s reassuring words, repeated reports from our commanders on the ground contributed to our concerns about Maliki’s government. Reports of nondelivery of services to Sunni areas, intervention by the prime minister’s office to stop military action against Shia targets and to encourage them against Sunni ones, removal of Iraq’s most effective commanders on a sectarian basis and efforts to ensure Shia majorities in all ministries — when combined with the escalation of Jaish al-Mahdi’s (JAM) [the Arabic name for the Mahdi Army] killings — all suggest a campaign to consolidate Shia power in Baghdad.
While there does seem to be an aggressive push to consolidate Shia power and influence, it is less clear whether Maliki is a witting participant. The information he receives is undoubtedly skewed by his small circle of Dawa advisers, coloring his actions and interpretation of reality. His intentions seem good when he talks with Americans, and sensitive reporting suggests he is trying to stand up to the Shia hierarchy and force positive change. But the reality on the streets of Baghdad suggests Maliki is either ignorant of what is going on, misrepresenting his intentions, or that his capabilities are not yet sufficient to turn his good intentions into action.
Well. This should certainly have some impact on Bush's upcoming meeting with al-Maliki in Jordan. Does that section I highlighted remind you of anyone?
Hadley then goes on to identify 'Steps Miliki Could Take' and 'What We Could do to Help Maliki' including:
¶Encourage Zal [Zalmay Khalilzad, the American ambassador] to move into the background and let Maliki take more credit for positive developments. (We want Maliki to exert his authority — and demonstrate to Iraqis that he is a strong leader — by taking action against extremists, not by pushing back on the United States and the Coalition.);
What Hadley doesn't seem to get is that the vast majority of Iraqis no longer want US troops in their country and that al-Maliki's push back against America is actually expressing that will, but he's not being a good sockpuppet so the Bush administration wants to rein him in.
And, even though Bush has consistently said that the US will not talk to the Iranian government unless it stops enriching uranium, Hadley suggests:
Continue to pressure Iran and Syria to end their interference in Iraq, in part by hitting back at Iranian proxies in Iraq and by Secretary Rice holding an Iraq-plus-neighbors meeting in the region in early December;
That would obviously include Iran.
And this is why Cheney visited Saudi Arabia:
¶Step up our efforts to get Saudi Arabia to take a leadership role in supporting Iraq by using its influence to move Sunni populations in Iraq out of violence into politics, to cut off any public or private funding provided to the insurgents or death squads from the region and to lean on Syria to terminate its support for Baathists and insurgent leaders.
Hadley acknowledges that expecting al-Maliki to exert more power is troublesome and adds:
We must also be mindful of Maliki’s personal history as a figure in the Dawa Party — an underground conspiratorial movement — during Saddam’s rule. Maliki and those around him are naturally inclined to distrust new actors, and it may take strong assurances from the United States ultimately to convince him to expand his circle of advisers or take action against the interests of his own Shia coalition and for the benefit of Iraq as a whole.
They sure don't have much faith in him and the influence they'd hoped to exert obviously hasn't panned out.
Second, we need to provide Maliki with additional forces of some kind.
So much for troops withdrawals any time soon...
The rest of his memo involves some nice pipe dreams when it comes to shifting the political reality in Iraq to one that is 'non-sectarian' and no matter how much the US government tries to spend its way into making that reality change by following Hadley's recommendation that it fund moderate groups, it all seem much too little much, much too late. They knew al-Maliki was in trouble as soon as he was elected and that sectarian factions in the country have been at cross purposes for decades. It seems they're trying to fix the situation the same way they deal with US elections - offering goodies for the base while trying to appease the rest of the fence sitters with lofty promises.
Right-wing bloggers will no doubt claim 'treason' against the NYT for making this memo public on the eve of Bush's meeting with al-Maliki, however:
An administration official made a copy of the document available to a New York Times reporter seeking information on the administration’s policy review. The Times read and transcribed the memo.
A senior administration official discussed the memorandum in general terms after being told The New York Times was preparing an article on the subject. The official described the document as “essentially a trip report” and not a result of the administration’s review of its Iraq policy, which is still under way.
It was reported earlier this month that Bush had set up his own little Iraq policy group that is to report to him despite the fact that the official Iraq Study Group (Daddy Bush's men) is set to make recommendations about the future of Iraq soon. That way he can just cherry-pick what he likes without actually listening to reason. Anyone who expects otherwise is just fooling themselves.
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