The American soldiers accused of raping an Iraqi girl and then murdering her and her family may have provoked an insurgent revenge plot in which two of their comrades were abducted and beheaded last month, it has been claimed.
Pte Kristian Menchaca, 23, and Pte Thomas Tucker, 25, were snatched from a checkpoint near the town of Yusufiyah on June 16 in what was thought at the time to be random terrorist retaliation for the killing of the al-Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in an American air strike two days earlier.
Now, however, residents of the neighbouring town of Mahmoudiyah have told The Sunday Telegraph that their kidnap was carried out to avenge the attack on a local girl Abeer Qassim Hamza, 15, and her family. They claim that insurgents have vowed to kidnap and kill another eight American troops to exact a 10-to-one revenge for the rape and murder of the girl.
In related news, the Washington Post reported on Saturday that the Marine officials in charge of initially investigating the Haditha massacre were seriously negligent in their duties.
Marine leadership failed multiple times, including in pre-deployment training, in the tone set by commanders, and in how information was reported up the chain of command, defense officials said.
The US military has obviously worn out its welcome in Iraq and will continue to do so as more information about these types of incidents becomes available. Bushco can no longer use the 'few bad apples' excuse when military investigators state that the training given to the troops is unsuited for the type of engagements they are involved in:
"You've got to prepare for the fight you're in today," said a second defense official, summarizing Chiarelli's findings on the military's inadequate training for counterinsurgency operations. "It's totally different" from fighting in Iraq two or three years ago, he said.
The Army, for example, tends in its training to emphasize using heavy firepower against the enemy, although classic counterinsurgency doctrine teaches that soldiers should use the minimal amount of force necessary to accomplish the mission.
Also, the Army early in Iraq tended to focus on killing or capturing insurgents, although counterinsurgency doctrine teaches that the best way to deal with an insurgent is to persuade him to change sides or to desert. Also, in contrast to a spate of cases of abuse of detainees, counterinsurgency theorists recommend treating captured fighters well, to encourage them to desert and to persuade others to give themselves up. Above all, people are seen as the prize in the war, not as its playing field.
Relegating people to the status of a 'prize' is repulsive enough - an analogy the reporter of that article might want to rethink, but when the public is clearly told that Rumsfeld's troops are not being properly trained they should also be calling, once again, for his resignation.
Incompetence, injustice and secrecy in a war zone breed revenge. That ought to be a simple enough concept to realize.
No comments:
Post a Comment